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In this article, Avi-Yonah argues that the
global intangible low-taxed income regime may
be an unconstitutional attempt to tax the
foreign-source income of foreign entities, and
he offers an alternative.
Copyright 2021 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah.
All rights reserved.
At first glance, the question in the headline
may appear to be frivolous. The global intangible
low-taxed income regime must be constitutional
— GILTI builds on subpart F, which built on the
foreign personal holding company (FPHC)
regime that was declared to be constitutional in
1
Eder back in 1943.
But perhaps it isn’t that easy. I consider this
issue not to argue the United States should
overturn GILTI, but rather to suggest GILTI
should be replaced with something better —
something that is constitutional — because it may
not be. GILTI depends on the deemed dividend
concept, a concept invented in 1937 to tax U.S.
1

Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943).
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shareholders on the passive income of FPHCs.
Three years earlier, Congress enacted the personal
holding company (PHC) provision, which was
identical to the FPHC regime except that the PHC
was a domestic corporation and was therefore
taxed at the corporate level — or if it was foreign,
2
the PHC was only taxed on U.S.-source income.
The PHC provisions did not address foreign
corporations earning foreign-source income,
because Congress believed it lacked jurisdiction to
3
tax those entities on foreign-source income.
Therefore, when it enacted the FPHC provision to
close this loophole, Congress invented the concept
of deemed dividends, perhaps reasoning that
because the U.S. individual shareholders
controlled the FPHC, they could make it pay a
dividend any time (under the constructive receipt
doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in
4
1930). Congress also provided that an FPHC

2

Section 542 (1934). See Jerome B. Libin, “Personal Holding
Companies and the Revenue Act of 1964,” 63 Mich. L. Rev. (1965).
3

John H. Alexander, “Foreign Personal Holding Companies and
Foreign Corporations That Are Personal Holding Companies,” 67 Yale
L.J. 1173 (1958).
4

The Joint Committee on Taxation, “Report on Tax Evasion and
Avoidance” (Comm. Print 1937), explained the FPHC proposal as
follows:
This proposal recommends a method of taxation which is a
departure from any previously used with respect to corporate
income. The committee feels, however, that this innovation is
necessary to protect the revenue and prevent further use of one of
the most glaring loopholes now existing. The proposal would affect
only foreign corporations which are owned 50 percent or more by
five American citizens or residents (including members of their
families) and which have the same type of investment income
which makes a domestic corporation subject to tax as a personal
holding company. Real foreign operating companies or widely held
holding companies are not included. . . . The committee believes
that the recommendation is not any more drastic than the situation
requires.
Previous congressional hearings focused on examples like Col. Jacob
Schick, inventor of the electric razor, who transferred his patent to a tax
haven and then expatriated, living off the accumulated royalties. See the
discussion of the intent of FPHC provision in Alvord v. Commissioner, 277
F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1960), emphasizing that the FPHC provision only
applies when the taxpayer can require a distribution. Under reg. section
1.451-2, “dividends on corporate stock are constructively received when
unqualifiedly made subject to the demand of the shareholder.” See Corliss
v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
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could not be a PHC. In 2004 the FPHC provision
was repealed — it was redundant after the
enactment of passive foreign investment
company regime in 1986 — and foreign
corporations were excluded from the scope of the
5
PHC provisions.
Congress’ belief that it could not tax foreign
corporations on foreign-source income was well
grounded. In Cook, the Supreme Court explained
that jurisdiction to tax must rest on one of two
6
bases: nationality/residence or territoriality. The
first (in personam) basis justified taxing U.S.
residents on worldwide income, and it also
justified taxation of U.S. citizens on worldwide
income even if they permanently lived outside the
United States (the case itself involved a U.S.
citizen living in Mexico who derived income from
real estate located in Mexico). The second (in rem)
basis justified taxing nonresident aliens on U.S.-

© 2021 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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source income. But there was no basis for taxing
foreigners on foreign-source income.7
The FPHC deemed dividend rule was
challenged as unconstitutional in Eder. The
taxpayer in Eder was a U.S. shareholder in a
Colombian FPHC that was forbidden by
Colombian law from distributing more than
$1,000 per year to its shareholders. In rejecting the
challenge, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
(with Judge Jerome Frank writing for a
unanimous panel that included Learned Hand)
justified the deemed dividend concept based on
the following analysis:
That the result under the statute here
before us may be harsh is no answer to the
government’s position; the purpose of
Congress was to deal harshly with
“incorporated pocketbooks,” and the
motive of a particular taxpayer who has
such a “pocketbook” we have held to be
irrelevant. . . . Interpreting the statute to
bring about such a consequence does not
render the statute unconstitutional; the
Congressional purpose was valid and the
method of taxation was a reasonable
means to achieve the desired ends.
[Internal citations removed.]
This is rather conclusory: There is no real
analysis regarding why Congress needed to deal

7

5

Section 542(c)(5). The IRS believes the accumulated earnings tax
applies to foreign corporations’ foreign-source income, but this does not
seem to have been tested in court. See section 532(b) (not excluding
foreign corporations other than PFICs).
6

Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (“Plaintiff assigns against the power,
not only his rights under the Constitution of the United States, but under
international law, and in support of the assignments cites many cases. It
will be observed that the foundation of the assignments is the fact that
the citizen receiving the income and the property of which it is the
product are outside of the territorial limits of the United States. These
two facts, the contention is, exclude the existence of the power to tax. Or
to put the contention another way, to the existence of the power and its
exercise, the person receiving the income and the property from which
he receives it must both be within the territorial limits of the United
States to be within the taxing power of the United States. The contention
is not justified . . . the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be
made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or
out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent
upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States,
but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of
the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the
native citizen who is taxed may have domicile, and the property from
which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the
tax be legal — the government having power to impose the tax.”).

284

The American Law Institute Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Law
divides jurisdiction into jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and
enforce. For jurisdiction to prescribe, the restatement specifies that a
state has jurisdiction if it falls under one of six headings: territory (the
conduct occurs within the state’s territory), effects (it has significant
effects within its territory), active personality (there is a personal
connection between the object of the rule and the state (nationality or
residence)), passive personality (the conduct affects nationals or
residents), the protective principle (involving acts that threaten the
sovereignty and security of the United States), and universal jurisdiction
(applies to some crimes that do not require a personal or territorial
connection). None of these bases for jurisdiction appear to justify
imposing a U.S. tax on nonresidents’ foreign-source income. For case
law rejecting attempts by the United States to require controlled foreign
corporations to abide by U.S. sanctions as exceeding U.S. jurisdiction to
prescribe, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “National Regulation of
Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and
Harmonization,” SSRN (Aug. 2002) (citing, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v.
Massardy, Court of Appeals of Paris, 14th Chamber (May 22, 1965); and
Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles SA v. Sensor Nederland BV, District
Court of the Hague (Sept. 17, 1982)). Of course, some U.S. courts may
take a different view of the matter. See also Avi-Yonah, “Does Customary
International Tax Law Exist?” in Research Handbook on International
Taxation 2 (2020) (arguing that the jurisdictional limits are customary
international law). Nationality jurisdiction as approved in Cook v. Tait is a
well-established aspect of international law, despite being unusual in the
tax context.
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harshly with incorporated pocketbooks or
whether another method of taxation — for
example, a tax on dividends with an interest
charge, as adopted later in the PFIC regime —
would have sufficed and prevented the harshness
of taxation when dividends were prohibited
8
under foreign law. Nor is there any discussion of
the limits that international law places on tax
jurisdiction or of Cook. This is probably because
the taxpayer argued the case based on Macomber,
not Cook, and in that context Frank had it right —
Macomber does not bar Congress from imposing a
tax on deemed dividends, and it had already been
limited to its facts in 1936 when the Supreme
Court found that a distribution of common stock
9
on preferred stock was taxable income. Frank, a
great supporter of the New Deal who served as
chair of the SEC before being elevated to the
federal bench, simply brushed all these issues
aside.
When subpart F was enacted in 1962,
Congress lifted the deemed dividend concept
from the FPHC provisions (and FPHC income is
one of the major components of subpart F income
10
to this day). This was challenged on
constitutional grounds in Garlock, a case involving
a Panamanian controlled foreign corporation, and
rejected by the Second Circuit in the following
words:
The argument that 951, which requires an
American shareholder to include in
income his pro rata share of a CFC’s
profits, is unconstitutional we think
borders on the frivolous in the light of this
court’s decision in Eder v. Commissioner,
138 F.2d 27, 28 (1943). That case held
constitutional the foreign personal
holding provisions of the income tax laws
upon which subpart F was patterned,
8

Other courts sought to mitigate the harshness. See, e.g., Alvord, 277
F.2d 713.
9

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). See also Koshland v.
Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 443 (1936) (noting that Macomber “affected only
the taxation of dividends declared in the same stock as that presently
held by the taxpayer”); and Moore v. United States, No. C19-1539-JCC
(W.D. Wa. 2020) (for a discussion of Moore, see infra notes 18-19 and
related text).
10

The 1961 JCT report on the Kennedy administration proposal
concluded that the tax was unconstitutional under Macomber,
distinguishing the FPHC as an antiavoidance rule. Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, “Constitutional Power to Tax Shareholders
on the Undistributed Income of a Corporation” (1961).
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permitting taxation of United States
shareholders on the undistributed net
income of Colombian corporations even
though Colombian law made the taxpayer
unable to receive such income in the
United States in excess of $1,000 per
11
month.
There is not much analysis here either.
Further, the other cases that the Garlock case relies
on (that is, besides Eder) don’t truly support the
outcome. Alvord held for the taxpayer, finding
that the U.S. shareholder was not required to
include disputed amounts in income when, under
the specific circumstances, the IRS forbade
distributions out of a FPHC, without addressing
12
constitutional issues. In Marsman, the Fourth
Circuit considered whether income earned by a
FPHC before its sole shareholder became a U.S.
13
resident could be taxed. The court resolved that
issue in the taxpayer’s favor, but the constitutional
issue was not raised.

11

Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973). The main
issue in Garlock was not the constitutional challenge but the taxpayer’s
attempt to avoid CFC status by selling 51 percent of voting preferred
shares to a friendly foreign investor, which the court also rejected.
Congress then changed the law to “by vote or value.” See also Whitlock v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 490, 507 (1972) (upholding subpart F against a
Macomber-based challenge because Congress could ignore the
separateness of the CFC (“If Congress has legislatively declared that it
will bypass the corporate entity in taxing certain foreign-source income,
the mere circumstance of petitioners’ interposition of a foreign corporate
framework between themselves and income over which they had
complete control would certainly be no constitutional barrier to the
taxation of that income to petitioners.”)); and Dougherty v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 917, 928-929 (1973) (“the doctrine of Eisner v. Macomber, supra,
does not prevent Congress from bypassing the corporate entity in
determining the incidence of Federal income taxation. This principle has
special application in the case of controlled foreign corporations, which
Congress has found to be frequently abused by their U.S. shareholders
as vehicles for the avoidance of tax. S. Rept. No. 1881, supra, 1962-3 C.B.
at 784-785. In subpart F, Congress has singled out a particular class of
taxpayers, U.S. shareholders, whose degree of control over their foreign
corporation allows them to treat the corporation’s undistributed
earnings as they see fit. Compare Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378
(1930), where the Supreme Court said, in connection with the taxability
of a grantor on the income of a revocable trust, ‘The income that is
subject to a man’s unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his
own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to
enjoy it or not.’”). Both of these cases were decided on the basis of
constructive receipt, but it is not clear that constructive receipt can apply
in the case of a U.S. shareholder like Moore who only has slightly more
than 10 percent of the vote and does not control dividend decisions. Nor
does “bypassing the corporate entity” apply to subpart F because some
of the income of the CFC is included and some is not, while treating the
CFC as a branch would entail including all of its income as well as its
losses on the U.S. parent’s return.
12

Alvord, 277 F.2d 713.

13

Marsman v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d, 216 F.2d
77 (4th Cir. 1954).

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/204
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780620
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

285

4

Avi-Yonah:

The basic problem therefore remains: Is it
clear that the deemed dividend mechanism is
constitutional under Cook, which remains valid
14
authority? This issue was not addressed in Eder
or Garlock. The argument that it is
unconstitutional would rest on the assertion that
deemed dividends are economically equivalent to
taxing a CFC on foreign-source income, which is
unconstitutional under the jurisdictional limits of
15
Cook and is also a violation of international law.
Interestingly, when Cook was decided, foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations were
covered by a mandatory consolidation regime
adopted in 1917. The War Revenue Act of 1917
(specifically regulation 41, articles 77 and 78) gave
the commissioner the authority to require related
corporations to file consolidated returns
“whenever necessary to more equitably
determine the invested capital or taxable income.”
In 1921 a statute authorized the commissioner to
consolidate the accounts of affiliated corporations
“for the purpose of making an accurate
distribution or apportionment of gains, profits,
income, deductions, or capital between or among
such related trades or business.” That legislation
was enacted, in part, because of the tax avoidance
opportunities afforded by possessions
corporations, which were not eligible to file
consolidated returns with their domestic
affiliates. The mandatory consolidation regime
was repealed in 1928 and replaced by the first
version of section 482.16 This might have occurred
because Congress realized that mandatory

14

Cook is a crucial decision. It underpins the U.S. system of
worldwide taxation for citizens, which has been part of U.S. tax law
since 1861. The Supreme Court would be reluctant to overrule it for this
reason, however misguided it may be. See Avi-Yonah, “The Case Against
Taxing Citizens,” University of Michigan Law and Economics Empirical
Legal Studies Center Paper No. 10-009 (Mar. 25, 2010).
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consolidation violated the jurisdictional limits set
forth in Cook.
If the deemed dividend mechanism is
unconstitutional, it raises serious issues for
17
subpart F, which relies on deemed dividends —
and, in turn, it undermines GILTI, which relies on
subpart F.
The issue could have been raised in the recent
Moore case, which attacked the constitutionality of
the transition tax imposed by section 965 in 2017
as a violation of the realization requirement and
as a tax on wealth, not income.18 In Moore the
district court correctly held that realization is no
longer a prerequisite, since later cases have
narrowed the application of Macomber to its facts,
and that section 965 applies to income, not wealth.
As the court explains:
Given the cabining of Macomber by the
Supreme Court and the clear departure
from it by other courts, there is no reason
for this court to conclude that Macomber
currently controls whether the
[mandatory repatriation tax] is an income
tax. Accordingly, the [mandatory
repatriation tax] does not violate the
Apportionment Clause, as it is a tax on
19
income rather than a direct tax.
But the Moore plaintiffs did not raise the
jurisdictional limits issue. The question is whether
some other plaintiff might. While CFCs may lack
standing to sue because they are not subject to tax,
their U.S. parents can sue on their behalf because
they are subject to tax under GILTI — a tax that
raises more than $10 billion each year.20
If the Supreme Court declared GILTI (and
subpart F) unconstitutional, what could Congress
do?
Presumably, mandatory consolidation of the
parent and the CFCs or a mandatory check-the-

15

Some argue that GILTI violates U.S. tax treaties by imposing tax on
the business profits of CFCs resident in treaty partner countries that do
not have a U.S. permanent establishment, but I agree with H. David
Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen that GILTI is acceptable for treaty
purposes as a tax on the U.S. parent and covered by the saving clause in
article 1(4). See Rosenbloom and Shaheen, “The TCJA and the Treaties,”
Tax Notes Int’l, Sept. 9, 2019, p. 1057.
16

T.D. 2694 (1918). See also War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat.
300 (1917); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, section 240(d), 42 Stat. 260
(1921) (reenacted in Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, section 240(d), 43 Stat.
288 (1924); and Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, section 240(f), 44 Stat. 46
(1926)). See generally Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A
Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,” 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89
(1995) (updated version available at 9 Fin. and Tax L. Rev. 310 (2006)).
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17

This is not a problem for “incorporated pocketbooks,” which are
taxed under the PFIC rules; the problem that led Congress to invent
deemed dividends in 1937 does not arise.
18

Interestingly, Moore was a 13 percent minority shareholder;
arguably, he could not have forced a distribution.
19

Moore v. United States, No. C19-1539-JCC. See also Annagabriella
Colón, “U.S. District Court Dismisses Repatriation Tax Case,” Tax Notes
Federal, Nov. 23, 2020, p. 1398.
20

See Thomas Horst, “Preliminary Estimates of the Likely Actual
Revenue Effects of the TCJA’s Provisions,” Tax Notes Int’l, Sept. 16, 2019,
p. 1153.
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box election to treat CFCs as branches of the
parent would be off-limits for the same reason
that deemed dividends are: They would also
amount to taxing the CFCs on foreign-source
income. Perhaps a formal case could be made that
the tax applies to the U.S. parent and not to the
CFCs and that ignoring the separateness of
subsidiaries has become the norm in other areas
of law (for example, bankruptcy or environmental
law). Another alternative that would presumably
be constitutional is to tax the parent on the change
in value of the CFCs’ stock resulting from the
CFCs’ earnings. Like the PFIC mark-to-market
regime, a tax on the unrealized appreciation of the
parent’s stock is not the same as a tax on the CFCs.
But the tax base would be different — the value of
the stock is not always perfectly correlated with
the underlying earnings — and, because the stock
is not publicly traded, valuation may lead to
disputes.
Congress could mandate that the value of a
CFC’s shares for mark-to-market purposes is
equivalent to the CFC’s earnings, but that would
once again run into the constitutional issue
because it is economically equivalent to taxing the
CFC on foreign-source income.
The best solution would be to redefine the
residency of CFCs, that is, to change the definition
of a domestic person in section 7701(a)(4) to
include CFCs (as defined in section 957). Nothing
in the Constitution or in Cook precludes Congress
from doing that. Article 4(1) of U.S. tax treaties
defines resident as “any person who, under the
laws of that Contracting State, is liable to tax
therein by reason of his domicile, residence,
citizenship, place of management, place of
incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar
nature.” Article 4(4) further states that when “by
reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this
Article a company is a resident of both
Contracting States, such company shall not be
treated as a resident of either Contracting State for
purposes of its claiming the benefits provided by
this Convention.” To the extent this language
precludes redefining CFCs as U.S. residents,
Congress can override the treaties.
There have been many proposals to redefine
corporate residency, such as including a managed
and controlled standard (like most of our trading
partners do), although that would raise issues
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regarding where a CFC is managed. Section 7874
(2004) already redefines the residency of some
inverted corporations as domestic based on U.S.
share ownership; this rule has not been
challenged, just avoided.21
Redefining residency would subject all CFCs
to current tax in full, and it would also permit
them to join in a consolidated return and use their
22
losses to offset U.S. domestic income. But that is
in fact the right outcome, especially in a world in
which the taxpayer controls whether a foreign
subsidiary is treated as such or as a branch, and in
which GILTI applies to all CFCs as a group.23 

21

See also J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay,
“Defending Worldwide Taxation With a Shareholder-Based Definition of
Corporate Residence,” 2016 BYU L. Rev. 1681 (Dec. 2016).
22

This assumes, as would generally be the case, that the CFC is at
least 80 percent owned by the U.S. parent by vote or value (most CFCs
are 100 percent owned by a single U.S. parent). I would support limiting
that redefinition of residency to CFCs eligible for consolidation, because
CFCs with significant foreign minority shareholders raise difficult
questions. An 80 percent threshold is also consistent with section 7874.
23

See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni, and Shay, “Expanded Worldwide Versus
Territorial Taxation After the TCJA,” Tax Notes, Dec. 3, 2018, p. 1173; and
Avi-Yonah, “Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing
Multinationals,” University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No.
364 (Aug. 4, 2015).
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